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 Abstract 
Although it has been given qualified approval by a number of  philosophers of 
education, the so-called ‘therapeutic turn’ in education has been the subject of 
criticism by several commentators on post-compulsory and adult learning over the 
last few years. A key feature of this alleged development in recent educational policy 
is said to be the replacement of the traditional goals of knowledge and understanding 
with personal and social objectives concerned with enhancing and developing 
confidence and self-esteem in learners. After offering some critical observations on 
these developments, I suggest that there are some educationally justifiable goals 
underpinning what has been described as a therapeutic turn.  Whilst accepting that 
‘self-esteem’ and cognate concepts cannot provide a general end or universal aim of 
education, the therapeutic function is more valuable and significant than is generally 
acknowledged.  This claim is justified by an examination of the concept of 
‘mindfulness’ which, it is argued, can be an immensely powerful and  valuable notion 
which is integrally connected with the centrally transformative and developmental 
nature of learning and educational activity at all levels. 
…To them I may have owed another gift, 
Of aspect more sublime: that blessed mood 
In which the burden of the mystery, 
In which the heavy and the weary weight  
Of all this intelligible world, 
Is lightened – that serene and blessed mood 
In which the affections gently lead us on… 
While, with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things..  
 
William Wordsworth – Tintern Abbey 
 
 The Therapeutic Turn in Education 
Smith (2002) has suggested that ‘our sense of what education can be stands to be 
enriched, not diminished, by a sufficiently nuanced appreciation of its connections 
with therapy’ (p.95), and a qualified role for this dimension of education has been 
advocated by Cigman (2004) and Kristjansson (2007).   Within educational debate in 
general the claim that educational policy and practice has been negatively influenced 
by a ‘therapeutic turn’ in recent years has been argued by a number of commentators 
(Ecclestone, 2004a,b; Hayes, 2003; Thompson, 2007).   Ecclestone (2004a), in 
particular, has expressed concern about the growing popularity of notions such as 
‘self esteem’ and ‘emotional intelligence’ in educational circles.   This has led to: 
new professional activities in emotional management, life coaching, mentoring, counselling, 
and interventions to build self-esteem and make people feel good emotionally in the pursuit of 
motivation, educational achievement and social inclusion (p.11). 
  
Moreover, it is claimed that the ‘professional and popular support for these ideas’ is 
now so strong ‘that they have become a new social and educational orthodoxy’ 
(ibid.).  More recently Ecclestone & Hayes (2008) have collaborated on a book which 
charts the ‘dangerous rise’ of therapeutic education at all levels of the UK education 
system. 
 
Hayes (2003) has advanced similar arguments in investigating recent policy trends in 
vocational education and training (VET) in the post-school sector.  The proposal is 
that – alongside the ‘triumph of vocationalism’ over the last few decades – there has 
been a ‘triumph of therapeutic education’ , a ‘form of preparation for work’ arising out 
of the ‘changed nexus between work and education’ (p.54).  He goes on to explain 
that: 
The new vocational skills that are required in the workforce are sometimes called ‘emotional’ 
or ‘aesthetic’ labour.  If post-school students are being trained in personal and social skills as 
well as in relationships, this is training in emotional labour…training in emotional labour… 
requires and receives a personal and wholehearted commitment to workplace values (ibid.) 
 
What results is a form of VET in which the pursuit of knowledge – and the values of 
‘rationality, objectivity, science and progress’ – are replaced by a set of post-
modernist relativistic values concerned only with developing ‘self-esteem’ (ibid.). 
 
The critique is deepened and widened with the claim that: 
All that society can offer is therapy and therapeutic organizations and initiatives to help adjust 
to the low expectations they are now expected to have.  This explains how the government 
can focus so much on ‘basic skills’, an ill-defined idea that often includes personal qualities 
and attitudes.  Talk about ‘basic skills’ means: ‘Get used to having limited expectations and 
no aspirations’ (p.55). 
 
This bleak picture is completed with the trenchant and dire warning that: 
As therapeutic education becomes the norm…the individualized and fractious workforce will 
be replaced by a workforce of the future in which every worker will be concerned with 
enhancing their own self-esteem and that of others. This future is not going to be a new  
creative age…The therapeutic future will be static and dull (ibid.) 
 
In the context of the discourse on adult education theory and practice, Thompson 
(2007) has expressed similar worries about the fact that: 
In the popular wisdom of adult education practice it is certainly the case that ideas about 
confidence, emotional intelligence, and self-esteem are commonplace.  The literature of 
funding applications, project reports and evaluation exercises are full of claims by policy-
makers and practitioners alike that interventions targeted at so-called non-traditional learners 
and socially excluded groups give rise to increased confidence and self-esteem (p.303). 
 
Such developments, Thompson argues, are dangerously misguided – not only 
because they neglect or marginalise some of the traditional core values of adult 
learning concerned with developing knowledge and understanding for active 
citizenship – but also in their tendency to suggest that ‘developing confidence and 
self-esteem can remedy a wide range of personal and social problems’  with the 
result that this ‘distracts attention from the structural causes inequality…and from the 
widening gap between rich and poor more generally’(p.304). 
 
Therapy and Education: Some Critical Observations 
Does this dystopian vision of contemporary education and training accord with 
reality?  More importantly, what do these claims about a therapeutic turn actually 
mean and are they justified against the background of recent trends in post-school 
education and training?  More significantly, for the purposes of my particular concern 
with the importance of mindfulness in personal educational growth and development, 
do the new emphases amount to anything more than giving due and proper attention 
to the affective domain of learning? 
 
I should begin by expressing a measure of agreement with some of the specific 
concerns voiced by critics of the alleged therapeutic turn in education.  If it is, indeed, 
the case that traditional goals linked to knowledge and understanding are being 
replaced by personal and social skills for post-school students, this trend should be 
forcefully criticised and resisted.  The alleged mutation of VET into some form of 
employability counselling also needs to be vigorously challenged, as does any 
transformation of the traditional social, political and cultural objectives of adult 
education into psychotherapy.  Before completely endorsing this crusade, however, 
we need to ask whether the claims about the therapeutic turn are sensible, coherent 
and justified.  There are two main ways of making sense of any such questions: 
through empirical investigation or by philosophical/conceptual analysis.  I intend to 
examine the therapeutic arguments by means of each method in turn. 
Empirical considerations   
There is some truth to Furedi’s (2003) critique of contemporary society in terms of its 
fostering of a ‘victim culture’ in which a pre-occupation with emotional well-being and 
self-esteem serves to anesthetise people in times of social and economic risk and 
uncertainty.  We might accept that there is simply too much emphasis on personal 
counselling and individual rights and not enough on active citizenship duties and 
responsibilities in current times. It must also be acknowledged that – if all this is true 
– it is regressive and disempowering.  What is difficult to discern, however, is how 
this putative change in general attitudes and ethos is influencing education trends to 
any great extent.  Most of the actual examples cited by Ecclestone (2004a,b), for 
example, are drawn from the general field of counselling and the popular press, not 
specifically from educational contexts.  She regrets the replacement of ‘optimistic 
Rogerian ideas about humans’ innate potential and drive for empowerment’ with 
‘pessimistic images of people locked in cycles of social depression caused by 
emotional problems’ (2004a,p.13).  If this were true, it would be most regrettable. 
However, it could be argued that – apart from a highly theoretical, inspirational 
impact akin to that of Paulo Freire on adult literacy tutors – Rogers has never had 
any practical influence on  post-school learning, at least as far as the United Kingdom 
(UK) post-compulsory sector is concerned.  I would suggest that the alleged 
pessimistic perspectives have no greater impact or influence on the business of 
learning and teaching in the post-16 sector in Britain. 
 
Indeed, this picture of a post-compulsory sector dominated by objectives linked to 
emotional intelligence and self-esteem is not one which is easily recognisable.  On 
the contrary, policy studies (Ainley, 1999; Hyland & Merrill, 2003) suggest that the 
key trends at this level over recent years have been the rise of undifferentiated skill-
talk, an obsession with prescriptive learning outcomes and the dominance of 
competence-based education and training (CBET).  The so-called therapeutic turn 
pales into insignificance alongside the damage wreaked by CBET and the 
behaviourist outcomes movement in the UK (see research by Roe, Wiseman & 
Costello, 2006)  bringing with it the  de-skilling of many occupations (including 
teaching), the downgrading of vocational studies and the rise to prominence of a 
predominantly utilitarian and one-sidedly economistic conception of the educational 
enterprise in general (Lea, et al, 2003; Hyland & Merrill, 2003; Hyland & Winch, 
2007).  Emphasising affective goals and fostering motivation and confidence in 
learners is far less dangerous than suggesting that all that counts in education and 
training is providing bits of evidence to satisfy narrow, mechanistic performance 
criteria. 
 
Moreover, given the fact that most learners in the post-school sector are either 
studying or increasingly preparing to re-sit secondary school graduation 
examinations these days (e.g. .GCSEs and A-levels in the UK) or pursuing vocational 
qualifications, the notion that such programmes are more than marginally concerned 
with building self-esteem or emotional intelligence is difficult to accept (basic skills or 
‘skills for life’ discussed below is, of course, extremely vocational and employment-
led and has little to do with the affective domain).  There is more than enough scope 
to argue that much of this post-16 learning is grossly deficient in precisely this 
affective area; it does not connect or engage sufficiently with the emotions, values 
and wider interests which learners bring with them to post-compulsory institutions 
(Hyland & Merrill, 2003).  The increase in mental health and emotional/behavioural  
problems in the sector is now being acknowledged with a view to researching and 
implementing strategies to remedy the main problems (Warwick et al, 2008). 
 
It is ludicrous to suggest that a sector which has been dominated for the last decade 
or so with ill-founded skill-talk and behaviourist CBET is somehow obsessed with 
affective objectives.  It is true that certain features of competence-based learning 
have been perversely (mis-) matched with progressive, individualised and student-
centred strategies (Hyland,1999), but this pedagogic absurdity no longer confuses or 
misleads anyone working in the further and higher education sector.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to make much sense of Hayes’ idea that basic skills – a self-evident pre-
requisite for learning of any kind – is an example of the reduction of education to 
therapy.  For learners, young or old, who achieved little at school and associate 
learning with anxiety, grief and failure, a ‘therapeutic’ concern with foundational skills, 
attitudes and motivations may be exactly what is called for. 
 
In the absence of detailed evidence in the form of appropriate research surveys or 
case studies, the empirical arguments for the existence of a therapeutic turn are 
weak, and a reflective agnosticism on the issue seems to be justified. 
 
Philosophical Considerations 
A central slogan in the progressive education movement of the earlier 20th century 
was ‘we teach children – not subjects’, and this was, as Dearden (1968) suggests, a 
direct reaction to the drab authoritarianism and inhuman social utility of the 
elementary school tradition in England (graphically depicted and satirized in Charles 
Dickens’ Hard Times and D.H. Lawrence’s The Rainbow). What was to become the 
UK’s paradigm text of the progressive movement– the Plowden Report published by 
the Department of Education and Science in 1967 – described the ideal school 
environment as ‘one in which children learn to live first and foremost as children and 
not as adults’. It was recommended that schools should set out to ‘devise the right 
environment for children, to allow them to be themselves’, and special emphasis was 
placed upon ‘individual discovery, on first-hand experience and on opportunities for 
creative work’ (Plowden Report, 1967, pp.187-8). 
  
Although there was always more rhetoric than reality (in a way similar to that 
surrounding the impact of Rogers and Freire on post-school education) about the 
claims that progressive philosophy was transforming English schools in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Hyland, 1979; Lowe,2007), such ideas did inspire the open education 
movement in America as the earlier influences of Dalton and Dewey were re-
discovered and applied to new times.  Rathbone (1971), one of the leading open 
education exponents of the period, claimed that Plowden’s views on the nature of 
childhood underpinned the ‘open education ethic’ which entailed treating children 
with ‘courtesy, kindness, and respect…valuing [the child] as a human being whose 
rights are no less valid than those of an adult’ (p.112).  In a similar vein, the new 
openness in education was described as ‘a way of extending the school’s human 
dimension’ (Pluckrose, 1975,p.3) and, more grandly, an ‘attempt to create a new 
human and social world’ (Bremer,1975, p.18).  In the stress on student-centredness 
and individualised learning, such perspectives later came to influence post-school 
education (Hyland & Merrill, 2003) as well though – in an era of behaviourist 
outcomes – any such affective aims could never be more than marginal to the 
acquisition of qualifications for working life. 
 
In the midst of all the rhetoric it is not difficult to recognise a number of fairly 
unexceptionable  notions about the fact that education is surely about personal 
development as well as acquiring knowledge and skills, and that even Peters’ (1966) 
liberal conception of education as the development of knowledge and understanding 
for its own sake must, in some sense, be linked to more general ends such as human 
happiness and flourishing or the promotion of a just community.  To be sure, the 
subject-matter of education cannot just be, as Whitehead (1962) once 
grandiloquently put it, ‘Life in all its manifestations’ (p.10) nor, as Dearden (1972) 
correctly argues, can the ‘aim of education simply be happiness, quite without 
qualification’ (p.111). However, as Dearden goes on to emphasise, there ‘is no 
question of whether or not happiness is valuable…the question is rather that of how 
important happiness is, compared with other values, in a specifically educational 
situation’(p.109).  Similarly, Smith (2002) suggests that ‘self-esteem can usefully be 
admitted into our educational scheme of things as a significant good, but not one 
pursued directly, still less exclusively’ (p.99).  For educational purposes, what needs 
to be attached to all-embracing external ends about self-esteem, happiness or 
human flourishing are internal objectives concerned with the development of 
knowledge, understanding, autonomy and values which will enable those being 
educated to construct and participate in communities which promote and reinforce 
such flourishing.  The affective dimension of educational activity – linked to both 
processes in terms of stimulating learners’ interests and motivation and also to 
content in the acknowledgement that knowledge and skills cannot be completely 
separated from human values and emotions  – is arguably what is being highlighted 
in referring to the therapeutic function of education. 
 
Wilson (1972) has pointed out that there are many connections and overlaps 
between education and therapy.  He observes that: 
Education involves initiation into activities, forms of thought, etc. which conceptually must 
be…worth while or justifiable.  Different types of justifications, or different descriptions of the 
mode in which they are worth while, may apply to different activities or groups of activities.  
Thus some may be called ‘therapeutic’, others described as ‘enlarging the personality’… 
These justification phrases may be said to represent the ‘aims of education’; and ‘therapeutic’ 
or ‘contributing to mental health’, may represent one such aim (pp.91-2). 
 
Peters (1972) also demonstrated the clear and distinct connections between human 
emotions, motivation and the sort of reasoning associated with the development of 
knowledge and understanding, and this seems to be what Smith (2002) is alluding to 
in arguing that to ‘say that we might make room for self-esteem without allowing it to 
take over the entire house of education or of therapy is to say that we need to see 
learning, personal identity, motivation and related matters through a wider lens’ 
(pp.99-100).  Wilson (1972) is getting at something similar when he argues that ‘we 
can say that certain educational processes just are the same as some processes 
which increase mental health: that some forms of teaching are identical with some 
forms of psychotherapy’ (p.89, original italics).  The idea is that both learning 
(education) and therapy involve the development of knowledge, values, emotions, 
understanding, reason, skill, experience and insight, and both are equally necessary 
for accessing work, social relationships and the wider communities of practice which 
constitute the good life.   
 
 
The Nature of Mindfulness 
In advocating and seeking to justify a form of therapeutic education along the lines 
outlined above, I want to draw attention to both the intrinsic and pragmatic value of 
the concept of ‘mindfulness’ (beautifully captured in the Wordsworth extract quoted at 
the beginning).  This is a core concept in Buddhist philosophy and practice – 
traditionally the seventh strand of the eightfold path leading to nirvana and the end of 
suffering – and is currently attracting widespread attention in a large number of 
spheres far removed from its natural and original home.  In the context of the Dharma 
(the Buddhist canon of teachings and precepts), mindfulness is of overriding 
importance. 
 
Thich Nhat Hanh (1999) – the  renowned Vietnamese Buddhist teacher and 
campaigner for world peace and justice – describes mindfulness as being ‘at the 
heart of the Buddha’s  teachings’.  It involves ‘attention to the present moment’ which 
is ‘inclusive and loving ‘ and ‘which accepts everything without judging or reacting’ 
(p.64).  Jon Kabat-Zinn (1990; 1994) and associates have been largely responsible 
for transforming the original spiritual notion into a powerful and ubiquitous therapeutic 
tool based on forms of meditation and mindful practices.  Mindfulness simply means 
‘paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment and non-
judgmentally’ in a way which ‘nurtures greater awareness, clarity, and acceptance of 
present-moment reality’.  Such practice – whether this involves breathing or walking 
meditation or giving full non-judgmental attention to everyday activities – can offer a  
‘powerful route for getting ourselves unstuck, back in touch with our own wisdom and 
vitality’ (Kabat-Zinn,1994, pp.4-5).  Such a simple idea has proved successful in a 
diverse range of contexts including the treatment of depression, addictions of various 
kinds, and the promotion of physical and mental health and wellbeing generally 
(Baer, 2006; Garfinkel, 2006). 
 
Since there may be a tendency to associate mindfulness exclusively with passive 
inner experience it is important to look more closely at its constituent features in 
order to display the specifically educational implications.  Kabat-Zinn (1990, pp.33-
38) offers a clear characterisation in terms of seven key aspects.   
1) Non-judgmental – involving the assumption of an impartial witness of our own 
experience.  When we begin paying close attention to the activity of our own 
mind, it soon becomes apparent that almost all thoughts and images are 
accompanied by a process of categorising and labelling in the form of noting 
some as  bad and some as good.  Instead of this constant judging – and the 
attendant favouring/disfavouring of certain patterns – we are asked to let go of 
such mechanical reactions and just be with the experience of thinking itself.  
2) Patience – an executive virtue in almost any context, in mindfulness work it 
means the wisdom not to strive or worry too much about external ends or goals, 
so that such  constant planning and deliberating does not overwhelm our 
perception of the present moment.  It is this unbidden mental restlessness which 
Schopenhauer described as the blind striving of the will and, interestingly, he also 
turned to Eastern spiritual practices to look for solutions (Hyland, 1985). 
3) Beginner’s mind – we are asked not to let our past experience and knowledge get 
in the way of our present thoughts and perceptions.   The idea is to cultivate an 
attitude of seeing things as if the for the first time so as to be alive to unforeseen 
or previously  unacknowledged possibilities in experience 
4) Trust – the development of a basic trust in the importance and value of our own 
thoughts, feelings and experiences.  This does not mean neglecting external 
forms of knowledge and authority but, rather, always, balancing these against our 
own authentic vision of the world (as perhaps we may do anyway, often very 
unmindfully). 
5) Non-striving – if mindfulness is practised through forms of meditation it has no 
goals beyond itself thus is not a susceptible to constant criticism and revision.  
We are simply paying attention to anything that is happening and this is the only 
end.  If mindfulness is applied to other activities – whether practical ones like 
driving a car or theoretical ones such as solving a problem or making a decision – 
the ends of goals are inherent in these activities.  Mindfulness simply assists in 
their achievement by directing attention only to the basic features and effective 
means whilst closing out extraneous influences. 
6) Acceptance – this involves a willingness to see things as they really are, not as 
we would like them to be.  It does not mean being passively resigned to tolerating 
present conditions but – by accepting the full reality of the present – allowing for 
change and development.  Whether it involves our  personal or our professional 
lives, acceptance leads to a facing up to rather than an avoidance of what we 
uniquely experience and perceive. 
7) Letting go – attending to inner experience soon reveals a range of thoughts and 
images which we want to either avoid or hold on to.   The tendency towards 
aversion or desire in terms of automatic, unreflective selection of states of mind – 
just as with the mind’s natural proclivity to dwell on the past or plan for the future  
- is to be resisted in mindfulness practice.  The idea is to simply watch thoughts 
and ideas appear and disappear without necessarily wanting to hold on to 
anything.  Such letting go is perhaps the most difficult part of a practice which 
seems – on first inspection – to be so incredibly, almost naively, simple. 
 
Like any process or activity which is concerned principally with introspection and a 
focus on inner thoughts and feelings, there seems to be a natural tendency to assign 
it a limited value because of its apparent passivity and subjective inward-looking 
character.  Smith (2002) notes this in remarking that some sort of ‘inward turn’ is 
‘often (but wrongly) associated with therapy in general’ (p.95). However, mindfulness 
does seem to be able to deal with such criticisms effectively, particularly when the 
concept is interpreted within the context of its original home in Buddhist philosophy 
and practice.   
 
The immense potential of paying close attention to our thought processes should not 
be under-estimated.  In its normal state, the mind is often in flux as it fixes on one 
object after another in a random and dissipated manner.  By ‘cultivating mindfulness’, 
the Dalai Lama (2005), reminds us, ‘we learn first to become aware of this process of 
dissipation, so that we can gently fine-tune the mind to follow a more directed path 
towards the objects on which we wish to focus’ (p.160).  It is important to note that 
such attention has 
a deliberate intention that helps us select a specific aspect or a characteristic of an object.  
The continued, voluntary application of attention is what helps us maintain a sustained focus 
on the chosen object.  Training in attention is closely linked with learning how to control our 
mental processes (ibid.,p.161). 
 
This control – which can be an end in itself in the therapeutic uses of mindfulness – is 
linked to the central Buddhist enterprise in the process of eliminating unhelpful and 
misleading conceptions of the self.  There is, of course, a similar critical tradition in 
relation to the concept of selfhood in Western philosophy stemming from Hume’s 
famous observation in his Treatise that ‘I never can catch myself at any time without 
a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception’ (1964,p.239, 
original italics).  Within the Buddhist tradition the notion of ‘non-self’ is remarkably 
similar to both Hume and the social constructionist perspectives of more recent 
times.  Brazier (2003) explains the position clearly in observing that the 
Buddhist approach is neither to build nor to abase the self.  It is to recognise the reality of our 
existential position in relationship with the world.  It recognizes our dependency upon 
conditions, and especially upon our physical environment… The teaching of non-self is not a 
denial of the existence of the person as a complex entity, functioning in a complex world.  
Non-self theory places people in dynamic encounter with one another and with the 
environment they inhabit.  It acknowledges the ever-unfolding social process and the ways in 
which people provide conditions for one another (p.138). 
 
Mindfulness and the Critique of Therapeutic Education 
There seem to be two main criticisms of the therapeutic function of education and I 
will address each in turn, drawing on mindfulness conceptions and cognate ideas in 
the attempt to answer the principal concerns. 
1) The emphasis on therapeutic objectives such as self-esteem, emotional 
intelligence, confidence and the like, is said to marginalise traditional goals linked to 
knowledge and understanding thereby disempowering learners.  Philosophical 
answers – in the form of explicating links between educational and therapeutic 
processes – were outlined earlier, as were empirical considerations questioning the 
extent of this influence on learning and teaching as opposed to popular culture.  I 
would argue that most educational activity – both at school but especially at post-
school levels – is affectively impoverished and grossly deficient in its treatment of 
humanistic as opposed to economistic matters.  The personal growth and 
development of learners – whether this is called fostering self-esteem, confidence or 
emotional intelligence – is an important educational objective, and the cultivation of 
mindfulness can assist in its achievement.  As a dimension of the learning process, 
mindfulness practice can effectively link all forms of learning (perhaps especially the 
undervalued basic skills and vocational kinds) with the needs, interests and values of 
learners thus fostering engagement, motivation and that form of ‘studentship’ which, 
as Bloomer & Hodkinson (1997) have shown, is crucial in allowing post-16 students 
to make sense and take ownership of the various programmes they are following.  
The ‘present-moment reality’ developed through mindfulness is now widely 
acknowledged in educational psychology as not just ‘more effective, but also more 
enjoyable’ (Langer, 2003, p.43) in many spheres of learning, and there is now a 
wealth of evidence aggregated through the Mindfulness in Education Network 
(http://www.mindfuled.org) about the general educational benefits of the approach. 
(there is also an established centre for mindfulness teaching and research at the 
University of Wales, Bangor, http://www.bangor.ac.uk/imscar/mindfulness).  
  
2) A related concern of critics of therapeutic education – particularly in adult 
education circles - is that the perceived inward-looking features associated with this 
activity severs the connections between learning and wider social and political 
issues.  Thompson (2007), for example, is worried that ‘lifelong learning has given up 
on teaching an understanding of the world, let alone trying to change it’, and that 
there is ‘every encouragement for the belief that because you cannot change the 
world, you must strive to change yourself’ (p.302).  Such claims, if true, would indeed 
be a cause for concern but I think they are misguided and unduly pessimistic.  The 
world can only be changed by people and often the reflective capacity to change 
ourselves is precisely what is required before any wider social change is possible. 
The  power and potential of mindfulness in engaging with a wide range of such 
issues has been demonstrated both by its  medical and psychotherapeutic 
applications (Williams, Teesdale, Segal & Kabat- Zinn , 2007) and also through work 
by socially engaged practitioners (Garfinkel, 2006). 
 
The letting go of self in mindfulness practice results – interestingly in terms of the 
standard criticisms of the passive navel-gazing involved in fostering self-esteem and 
related qualities – in people stopping ‘relying on self-power and starting to rely more 
on other-power’ (Brazier, 2003,p,143).  This is the definitive conception of 
empowerment which is prized so highly by adult educators concerned with social 
movements and is fully realised in the impact of Buddhist mindfulness in countries 
around the world.  In the form of ‘socially engaged Buddhism’ (Garfinkel, 2006; a 
movement pioneered by Thich Nhat Hanh ) –  mindfulness practices are now 
employed in prison education, peace negotiations and the re-generation of village 
communities in deprived areas around the world.  As Garfinkel explains, such 
practice is 
being applied to augment mental and physical health therapies and to advance political and 
environmental reforms.  Athletes use it to sharpen their game. Through it, corporate 
executives learn to handle stress better.  Police arm themselves with it to defuse volatile 
situations.  Chronic pain sufferers apply it as a coping salve. (p.3).     
 
Conclusion: Mindfulness and the Aims of Education 
Smith (2002) is quite correct to locate self-esteem amongst the legitimate aims of 
education, and I have tried to provide a justification for a more general therapeutic 
function based on mindfulness.   Mindfulness serves to remind us that – in addition to 
the important goals of developing knowledge, understanding, vocational skills and 
the critical examination of  issues of inequality, prejudice and social exclusion – there 
are people with identities, needs, values and life stories who are engaged in the 
struggle to deal with all this.  Much current educational practice fails to capture this 
struggle and does not touch the emotional grief and suffering involved. The Buddha 
famously said that he taught one thing and one thing only: ‘suffering and the 
cessation of suffering’ (Segal, 2003, p.165), and this core teaching is of inestimable 
value in our current educational climate.  In helping us to let go of the often mindless 
and restless  striving which lies at the heart of our mental processes and habit-driven 
behaviour, mindfulness prepares the way for genuinely rich and deep learning and 
the journey from self-obsession to a fuller engagement with life and with others. 
There can be few worthier educational ideals. As Thich Nhat Hanh (1999) puts it: 
Mindfulness helps us look deeply into the depths of our consciousness…When we practice 
this we are liberated from fear, sorrow and the fires burning inside us.  When mindfulness 
embraces our joy, our sadness, and all our mental formations, sooner or later we will see their 
deep roots…Mindfulness shines its light upon them and helps them to transform (p.75). 
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